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Defining Religious Discrimination In Employment:
Has Reasonable Accommodation Survived
Hardison?
Because the primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964'
was the elimination of racial discrimination,2 not surprisingly the
Act's legislative history left unclear the congressional intent of
also including religion as an illegal ground for employment dis-
crimination under Title VII. After 1964, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC)' and the courts struggled to
interpret Title VII's prohibition of religious discrimination.' In
1972, Congress amended Title VII to explicitly protect religious
conduct, as well as beliefs, provided the employer might"reasonably accommodate" the conduct without "undue hard-
ship" to his business.' In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,7
however, the United States Supreme Court held that Title VII
did not require an employer to accommodate employee Sabba-
tarian practices conflicting with the provisions of a bona fide
seniority system. The Court interpreted the amended Title VII's"accommodation" provision narrowly, holding, under a reverse
religious discrimination rationale, that employers need not ac-
commodate religious employees if the accommodation would dis-
criminate against other employees.' Regrettably, lower courts
have oversimplified and inconsistently interpreted Hardison,
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. (1976)).
2. See generally Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role of Arbi-
tration Under Title VI, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 599, 599-602 (1971). "IT]he entire Civil Rights
Act was written with an eye toward the elimination of the 'glaring . . . discrimination
against Negroes which exists throughout our nation.'" Id. at 599-600 (citing H.R. REP.
No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963)).
3. See Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 600. After an examination of the House
debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, these commentators state: "open debates on the
Committee of the Whole House for consideration of H.R. 7152 . . . brought out that the
Committee on the Judiciary received very little, if any, evidence of religious discrimina-
tion." Id. at 601 n.10. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e to e-17 (1976).
4. Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as part of Title
VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1976).
5. See text accompanying notes 8-20 infra.
6. "The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as
well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommo-
date to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." 42 U.S.C. § 2 000ej) (1976).
7. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
8. See text accompanying notes 53-57 infra.
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once again confusing the measure of employers' duty in religious
discrimination cases.
Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
religious discrimination in employment,' it originally defined nei-
ther "religion" nor "religious discrimination.' 0 Attempting to
define these terms, the EEOC issued religious discrimination
guidelines" that specifically require employers "to make reason-
9. Title VII provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(c) Labor organization practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for member-
ship, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual in violation of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (c) (1976).
10. Title V11 does define discrimination generally, see id. at § 2000e-2(a)(2), (c)(2),
but does not have a separate definition giving any special meaning to the term "religious
discrimination."
11. The EEOC issued guidelines on religious discrimination on two occasions. The
1966 guidelines provide, in pertinent part:
(a) (1) Several complaints filed with the Commission have raised the ques-
tion whether it is discrimination on account of religion to discharge or to refuse
to hire a person whose religious observances require that he take time off during
the employer's regular workweek. These complaints arise in a variety of con-
texts, but typically involve employees who regularly observe Saturdays as the
Sabbath or who observe certain special holidays during the year.
(2) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious
grounds includes an obligation on the part of the employer to accommodate to
the reasonable religious needs of employees and, in some cases, prospective
employees where such accommodation can be made without serious inconveni-
ence to the conduct of the business.
(3) However, the Commission believes that an employer is free under Title
VII to establish a normal workweek (including paid holidays) generally applica-
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able accommodations to the religious needs of employees and
prospective employees" unless the accommodation would cause
undue hardship to the employer's business."2 The use of the broad
phrase "religious needs" indicates the EEOC interpreted the Act
as protecting not only religious beliefs, but also religiously based
conduct. Additionally, the EEOC omitted a statement in an ear-
lier set of guidelines that allowed employers to establish work
schedules regardless of the effect on employees' "religious
needs.' 1 3 This change indicates that an employer could not rebut
a charge of discrimination by mere proof of equal treatment.
A 1971 United States Supreme Court decision, however, re-
duced the EEOC guidelines' broad protection of religious employ-
ees. In Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.," the Court affirmed with-
ble to all employees, notwithstanding that this schedule may not operate with
uniformity in its effect upon the religious observances of his employees. For
example, an employer who is closed for business on Sunday does not discrimi-
nate merely because he requires that all his employees be available for work on
Saturday. Likewise, an employer who closes his business on Christmas or Good
Friday is not thereby obligated to give time off with pay to Jewish employees
for Rosh Hashanah or Yom Kippur.
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966) (re-vised 1967). The EEOC replaced these guidelines in 1967 by guidelines reading as follows:
(a) Several complaints filed with the Commission have raised the question
whether it is discrimination on account of religion to discharge or refuse to hire
employees who regularly observe Friday evening and Saturday, or some other
day of the week, as the Sabbath or who observe certain special religious holidays
during the year and, as a consequence, do not work on such days.
(b) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious
grounds, required by section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes
an obligation on the part of the employer to make reasonable accommodations
to the religious needs of employees and prospective employees where such ac-
commodations can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business. Such undue hardship, for example, may exist where the
employee's needed work cannot be performed by another employee of substan-
tially similar qualifications during the period of absence of the Sabbath ob-
server.
(c) Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or refusing
to hire an employee or applicant on account of his religious beliefs, the em-
ployer has the burden of proving that an undue hardship renders the required
accommodations to the religious needs of the employee unreasonable.(d) The Commission will review each case on an individual basis in an effort
to seek an equitable application of these guidelines to the variety of situations
which arise due to the varied religious practices of the American people.
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1978).
12. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b)
(1978). The guidelines also placed the burden of proof on the issue of undue hardship on
the employer. Id. § 1605.1(c).
13. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 §
(a)(3) (1966) (revised 1967). See note 11 supra.
14. 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
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out opinion a Sixth Circuit decision questioning the EEOC's in-
terpretation of Title VII.15 The Court of Appeals held that al-
though Title VII prohibited employers from discriminating be-
cause of religion,"6 it did not require employers to make special
concessions to their employees' religious beliefs. 7 The court said
that the EEOC's accommodation requirement was inconsistent
with Congress' intent to prohibit only intentional discrimina-
tion.' Thus, the mere failure to accommodate an employee's"religious needs" was not illegal religious discrimination.
Responding directly to Dewey,20 Congress passed section
701(j) of the 1972 amendments to Title VII providing that
"'[religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that
he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or pro-
spective employee's religious observance or practice without
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.""1
Coupled with Title VII's prohibition of employment discrimina-
tion because of religion,2 section 701(j)'s definition of "religion"
overrode Dewey by equating, under some circumstances, failure
to accommodate religious conduct = with illegal religious discrimi-
nation. Under the amended Title VII, before concluding that an
15. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 331 n.1 (6th Cir.), rehearing denied,
429 F.2d 334, 334 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 402 U.S.
689 (1971). Following the court of appeals's decision in Dewey, another court questioned
the EEOC's guidelines. Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd,
464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972) (the court of appeals reversed after Congress amended Title
VII).
16. 429 F.2d at 328.
17. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 334, 334 (6th Cir.), denying rehearing to
429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689
(1971).
18. Id.
19. "The fundamental error of Dewey and the Amici Curiae is that they equate
religious discrimination with failure to accommodate. We submit these two concepts are
entirely different. The employer ought not to be forced to accomodate each of the varying
religious beliefs and practices of his employees." Id. at 335.
20. "The purpose of this subsection is to provide the statutory basis for EEOC to
formulate guidelines on discrimination because of religion such as those challenged in
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company. ... 118 CoNG. REc. 7564 (1972) (remarks of Rep.
Perkins), reprinted in SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC
WELFARE, 92D CONG., 2D SEss., LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPoRTUN-
rry AcT OF 1972, at 1845 (Comm. Print) [hereinafter cited as LEGisLAT'vE HISTORY].
21. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(7), 86 Stat.
103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976)).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). See note 9 supra.
23. Section 701(j) contrasts beliefs with observances and practices, making no dis-
tinction between the latter two concepts. This comment will assume religious "practices"
or "observances" refers to any conduct based on religious beliefs.
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employer has engaged in illegal religious discrimination, a court
must complete a three-step process of finding that 1) the em-
ployee's conduct or belief is religious in nature, 2) the employer
can accommodate the employee's conduct without undue hard-
ship in accord with the statutory definition of religion, and 3) the
employer discriminated against the employee because of the
employee's religion.
Although section 701(6) indicates Congress considered both
conduct and beliefs as forms of protected religion, it gives no
guidance to courts making the preliminary decision of whether a
given belief or action is religious.2 ' In determining this question
for purposes of Title VII, courts2 have sought guidance from cases
defining "religion" as the term is used in the free exercise clause
of the first amendment." Although courts have required a belief
be sincerely held and of a theological character to qualify for first
amendment protection, 27 courts interpret both requirements
broadly28 and seldom find beliefs or conduct nonreligious, if
24. Congress added § 701(j) to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
during floor debates in the Senate. The section's brief legislative history deals almost
entirely with the question of Sabbath observances, which the debators assumed were"religious." Senator Randolph, the proponent of § 701(j), made only one reference to the
scope of the term "religion," stating:
The term "religion" as used in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 encompasses,
as I understand it, the same concepts as are included in the first amendment-
not merely belief, but also conduct; the freedom to believe, and also the freedom
to act.
I think in the Civil Rights Act we thus intended to protect the same rights
in private employment as the Constitution protects in Federal, State, or local
governments.
118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972), reprinted in LEoIsATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 713.
25. See, e.g., Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1978) (refused to give
the term "religion" a narrower meaning in Title VII than the Supreme Court has given it
in the first amendment); McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 571 F.2d 338, 340 (6th Cir. 1978)
(implied that Title VII protects at least those religious practices the Constitution pro-
tects); Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (implied that anything
not protected as religion by the Constitution could not be protected as such by Title
VII). See generally Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HAv. L. Rv.
1056, 1075 (1978).
26. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972); United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965); Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896, 899 (E.D.N.Y.
1977).
28. In ascertaining whether a belief is sincerely held, courts, to avoid becoming em-
broiled in purely theological debates, will not consider whether the belief is consistent,
logical, true, or acceptable to others. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-85 (1965);
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
310 (1940). As stated by Justice Douglas:
348 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 2:343
claimed as such by an employee.2'
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of
their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as
life to some may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be
beyond the ken of mortals does not mean they can be made suspect before the
law.
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86-87. The Supreme Court later stated this same
idea more strongly, declaring "it is no business of courts to say that what is a religious
practice or activity for one group is not religion under the protection of the First Amend-
ment." Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953). Two commentators have sum-
marized the Supreme Court's religion analysis with an appropriate metaphor: "In short,
since religion is based on a sometimes irrational faith, consistency of belief cannot serve
as a litmus paper test of conviction or hypocrisy. The sincerity of one's religious beliefs
simply cannot be measured by mere mortals." Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 616.
In determining whether a belief is theological, the courts do not require belief in a
supreme being. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). "Among religions in this
country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence
of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others." Id. at
495 n.11 (dictum). See Note, supra note 25, at 1063. Title VII prohibits discrimination
not only against certain religious beliefs, but also in favor of certain beliefs, or in favor of
religion over nonreligion. Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th
Cir. 1975). In that case the court held Title VII protected an atheist employee against
being required to attend staff meetings beginning with a prayer. Id. at 141-43.
The term "theological" is used only to exclude as nonreligious those beliefs grounded
on mere policy, pragmatism, or expediency. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342-43
(1970).
29. Since passage of the 1972 amendment, courts have found six different practices
to be religious conduct under Title VII, though in some cases the reasonable accommo-
dation standard excluded that conduct from protection.
Most of the cases have involved a refusal to work on a Sabbath or Holy Day, Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Rohr v. Western Elec. Co., 567 F.2d
829 (8th Cir. 1977); Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977);
Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978);
Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 561 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1977); Ward v. Allegheny Ludlum
Steel Corp., 560 F.2d 579 (3rd Cir. 1977); Huston v. Local 93, UAW, 559 F.2d 477 (8th
Cir. 1977); United States v. City of Albuquerque, 545 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977); Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co., 529 F.2d 483 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959 (1976); Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d
515 (6th Cir. 1975); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976); Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 497 F.2d 128 (5th Cir.
1974); Wren v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 453 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mo. 1978); Dixon v. Omaha
Pub. Power Dist., 385 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Neb. 1974); Olin Corp. v. Fair Employment
Practices Comm'n, 67 Ill. 2d 466, 367 N.E.2d 1267 (1977); Kentucky Comm'n on Human
Rights v. Commonwealth, 564 S.W.2d 38 (Ky. 1978).
The second most common cases have involved employees refusing to join or pay dues
to a labor union, Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3464 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1979) (No. 78-706); Anderson v. General Dynam-
ics, 589 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1978); McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978);
Cooper v. General Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908
(1977); Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974); Nottelson v. A.O.
Smith Corp., 423 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Prods., Inc.,
583 P.2d 860 (Alaska 1978); Bald v. RCA Alascom, 569 P.2d 1328 (Alaska 1977).
Religious Discrimination
Even if the employee's conduct qualifies as "religion" under
the broad first amendment test, the "reasonable accommodation-
undue hardship" standard may exclude such conduct from Title
VII protection. Although section 701(j) initially offers protection
for "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as
belief," it specifically excludes all conduct the employer cannot
reasonably accommodate without undue hardship to his busi-
ness.30 Literally, the statute says any conduct an employer "is
urable to reasonably accommodate" is not religion. Actually, the
nature of the employer's business cannot change the nature of the
employee's conduct. The statute, however, can and does define
the limits of Title VII's protection of religious conduct in terms
of the effect protecting such conduct would have on the employer.
To illustrate the difference between the literal and actual
effect of section 7016), consider two employees, a bookkeeper and
an assembly line worker. Both employees have joined a new reli-
gion requiring them to stand, without working, in prayerful si-
lence for five minute intervals at several prescribed times
throughout the day. Such a practice is clearly theological and,
assuming the existence of evidence that the employees sincerely
believe this requirement, the conduct would qualify as religious
conduct under Title VII. The employer could accommodate the
bookkeeper simply by tolerating his religious actions and such
accommodation probably would not cause any hardship to the
employer's business.3' Thus, Title VII protects the bookkeeper's
The four other practices found to be religious conduct are refusal by an atheist to
attend a staff meeting begun with a prayer, Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975), wearing a beard, Eastern Greyhound Lines Div., Inc. v. New
York State Div. of Human Rights, 27 N.Y.2d 279, 265 N.E.2d 745, 317 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1970)
(decided prior to 1972 amendment to Title VII), attending Bible studies, Redmond v.
GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1978), and attending ministers' meetings, Weitennaut
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 381 F. Supp. 1284 (D. Vt. 1974).
The only Title VII case where a court has refused to recognize a belief as religious is
Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1977). In that case, the court held that the
plaintiff's "personal religious creed," that "Kozy Kitten Cat Food" contributed to his
well-being by increasing his energy, to be a mere personal preference beyond the para-
meters of the concept of religion as protected by Title VII. Id. at 1383-84.
30. One might interpret § 7010) as imposing two requirements on any proposed
accommodation: the accommodation must be reasonable and must not cause undue hard-
ship to the employer's business. Congress, however, apparently intended § 7016) to con-
tain only one requirement. During debates, the Senate analyzed hypothetical accommo-
dation cases, using undue hardship as the only test for whether § 701(j) would require a
given accommodation. 118 CONG. Rac. 706 (1972), reprinted in LoisLATnvE HIsToRY, supra
note 21, at 714-15. One may view reasonableness and undue hardship as merely flip sides
of the same coin: an accommodation is reasonable if it does not cause undue hardship to
the employer's business and unreasonable if it does.
31. This assumes, of course, that the bookkeeper works in a basically independent
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conduct. Yet assuming that the employer could accommodate the
assembly line worker only by operating the production line in
conformity with the prayer schedule, and that this would cause
undue hardship to the employer's business in the form of lost
production, then this same conduct is excluded from Title VII
protection. Although Title VII does not protect the assembly line
worker, his conduct is still as religiously based as the bookkeep-
er's. Because of the context in which the religious conduct takes
place, however, Title VII protects the bookkeeper, but not the
assembly line worker, against discrimination based on that con-
duct.
Even if an employee's conduct fits the first amendment defi-
nition of religion and is not excluded from Title VII protection by
section 701(j)'s "reasonable accommodation" standard, to win a
claim of religious discrimination the plaintiff must prove the
employer discriminated because of religion. Courts recognize two
forms of discrimination under Title VII, disparate treatment and
disparate impact.32 Claims of disparate treatment, resulting when
an employer treats an employee, or prospective employee, ad-
versely because of a protected characteristic, rarely have been
raised in Title VII religious discrimination cases.3 3 Almost all
manner, so five minutes lost at one time can be made up at another without loss in
productivity.
32. Several commentators have identified and labeled various forms of discrimina-
tion. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw (1976) (four forms:
disparate treatment, present effects of past discrimination, adverse impact, and reasona-
ble accommodation); Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and
the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. Rzv. 59, 66-75 (1972) (three
forms: malicious, intentional, and unintentional discrimination); Edwards & Kaplan,
supra note 2, at 619 (three forms: intentional discrimination, discrimination by effect, and
discrimination under the reasonable accommodation-undue hardship standard). All the
suggested categories, however, are either other names for, or explainable in terms of,
disparate treatment or impact.
33. One reason for this conspicuous lack of reported cases of disparate treatment on
the basis of religion may be that those employers likely to discriminate on the basis of
religion fall within one of the three exemptions from Title VII coverage. Generally, Title
VII applies to any employer "engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen
or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
Two of the exemptions to this general coverage apply only to religious discrimination.
Section 703(e)(2) permits schools, colleges, universities, or other educational institutions:
[Tbo hire and employ employees of a particular religion if [the institution] is,
in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a
particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of
such [institution] is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (1976). Section 702, as amended in 1972, provides an even
broader exemption:
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claims of religious discrimination under Title VII have involveddisparate impact, which occurs when an employer's business
practice, neutral on its face, adversely affects employees observ-
ing a particular religious faith." An employer can defend againsta claim of disparate impact discrimination by showing the chal-lenged business practice is a business necessity. 5 The business
necessity defense, however, will seldom prevent a court from find-
ing illegal religious discrimination. Before reaching the question
of discrimination, the court, in applying Title VII's "reasonable
accommodation-undue hardship" standard, must first conclude
that the employer could modify the business practice in question
without undue hardship. The court probably would not consider
this same business practice a business necessity." Consequently,
This subchapter shall not apply to. . .a religious corporation, association,
educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individualsof a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such
corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1976). The third exemption applicable to sex, national origin, andreligious discrimination, is commonly referred to as the BFOQ (bona fide occupational
qualification) exemption and is in § 703(e)(1):
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, (1) it shall not be anunlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees
• ..on the basis of. . .religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instan-
ces where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualifica-tion reasonably necessary to the operation of that particular business or enter-
prise ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1976). See generally B. ScHLM & P. GRosSM, supra note 32,
at 218-19.
Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976), is the only reportedTitle VII religious discrimination case in which the employer treated an employee ad-versely because of the employee's religion. In that case the court held verbal abuse of a
Jewish employee was illegal discrimination under Title VII.34. For example, a business practice of assigning work schedules on the basis ofseniority may have an adverse effect on Sabbatarians who will not work on Saturdays.See text accompanying notes 38-40 infra. Also, a business practice against hiring anyonewith a beard precludes hiring male Orthodox Muslims, whose religion forbids shaving.
Eastern Greyhound Lines Div., Inc. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 27 N.Y.2d279, 265 N.E.2d 745, 317 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1970). To obtain relief under Title VII, anyemployee not discriminated against directly for his beliefs, but discriminated againstindirectly through an employer's business! practice inhibiting him from practicing his
beliefs, must rely on the disparate impact theory of discrimination.
35. For an analysis of the early development of the business necessity defense, see
Blumrosen, supra note 32, at 81-89.
36. Courts occasionally have implied the business necessity defense and the unduehardship standard are actually the same test. "'[Rleasonable accommodation' and'undue hardship' can be derived from the 'business necessity' test of Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 . .. . (1971), for these verbal formulations are really exemplary of thestatute's general purpose of preventing unreasonable discrimination in employment."
Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Prods., Inc., 583 P.2d 860, 864 n.4 (Alaska 1978); see, e.g., Rileyv. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972).
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the business necessity defense will rarely defeat claims of reli-
gious discrimination, leaving the issue of whether accommodat-
ing the employee will cause the employer "undue hardship" as
the only difficult hurdle in most cases.
The United States Supreme Court, in Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison,37 interpreted the reasonable accommodation
requirement of section 701(j) narrowly, holding that the em-
ployer, Trans World Airlines (TWA), did not have to accommo-
date the Sabbath practices of its employee, Hardison.3 1 Hardison,
a member of the Worldwide Church of God, refused to work on
his church's Sabbath, from sunset Friday to sunset Saturday.
TWA and the union representing Hardison had negotiated a
collective bargaining agreement with a seniority system provision
requiring TWA to give first choice for shift assignments based on
departmental seniority .3 Although accommodated at his first
department, Hardison transferred to a different department
where he had insufficient seniority to obtain a work schedule
consistent with his religious practice. In accordance with com-
pany procedure, TWA fired Hardison after he missed work on
several Saturdays. The Court held TWA had not violated Title
VII's prohibition against religious discrimination because any
accommodation of Hardison's religious practice would have
caused undue hardship to TWA's business.40 The Court consid-
ered and rejected three possible ways TWA could have accommo-
dated Hardison: "swapping" shifts between Hardison and an-
other employee with greater seniority, running the department
short-handed one day a week, or filling in Hardison's Sabbath
day hours with other personnel."
The first possible accommodation, swapping shifts, would
have violated the seniority system provision in the collective bar-
gaining agreement.4 2 Basing its decision on Title VII's special
37. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
38. The Court had twice before heard religious discrimination cases. In both cases,
however, the Court divided evenly, affirming the court of appeals decison without opinion,
and thus, without setting a precedent. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 429 U.S. 65 (1976)
(per curiam) (affirming a judgment for the employee), vacated per curiam, 433 U.S. 903
(1977) (remanded for reconsideration in light of Hardison); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
402 U.S. 689 (per curiam) (affirming a judgment for the employer).
39. 432 U.S. at 80.
40. Id. at 77.
41. Id. at 76-77. The court of appeals had suggested these alternatives, holding that
all three were reasonable and that any one of them would have satisfied TWA's obligation
under Title VII without undue hardship. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d
33, 39-42 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
42. 432 U.S. at 78-79.
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deference to seniority systems, the Court held Title VII did notrequire TWA "to carve out a special exception to its seniority
system in order to help Hardison to meet his religious obliga-
tions." 3 In reaching this conclusion, the Court followed its earlierinterpretation of another section of Title VII, section 703(h),
which provides that, absent proof of intentional discrimination,
an employer may treat employees differently pursuant to a bonafide seniority system." In International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. United States,"5 the Court held "the unmistakable purpose ofsection 703(h) was to make clear that the routine application of
a bona fide seniority system would not be unlawful under Title
VII"" The Hardison Court concluded that, even if the system hassome discriminatory consequences, it would not be an unlawful
employment practice unless the employer or union had estab-
lished the system with a discriminatory purpose."
The Court offered several other rationales to support its deci-sion that section 701(j) did not require an employer to modify a
seniority system. The Court stated that seniority systems werethemselves significant accommodations of the religious and secu-
lar needs of all employees because such systems provide a neutral
method of determining which employees would have to work on
days they preferred to have off.18 Additionally, the Court held
that Title VII neither requires an employer to breach an otherwise
valid agreement"9 nor deprives other employees of their contract
rights."e The Court, using a reverse religious discrimination analy-sis,"' reasoned that Title VII prohibits discrimination against
43. Id. at 83.
44. Section 703(h) provides, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards ofcompensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pur-
suant to a bona fide seniority or merit system . . . , provided that such differ-
ences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
45. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
46. Id. at 352.
47. 432 U.S. at 82.
48. Id. at 78.
49. Id. at 79.
50. Id. at 80.
51. Currently, the leading reverse discrimination case is University of Cal. Regentsv. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Under an equal protection analysis the Court permitted a
medical school to consider race as one factor in its admissions program, id. at 272 (Powell,J.); id. at 326 (Brennan, J., White, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring in this
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majorities as well as minorities, and, therefore, an employer can-
not deny some employees shift and job preferences just to accom-
modate other employees' religious needs.52
The Court elaborated on this reverse religious discrimination
rationale in disposing of the second and third possible methods
of accommodation, neither of which required modification of the
seniority system. Rejecting the possibility of running the depart-
ment short-handed or of filling in with other personnel during
Hardison's Sabbath shift,53 the Court found both alternatives
would increase TWA's expenses and held that any accommoda-
tion costing more than a de minimis amount constitutes "undue
hardship."54 The Court reasoned that requiring TWA to incur
costs by giving Hardison Saturdays off would benefit Hardison
because of his religion and thus discriminate against other em-
ployees of different religious faiths.55 The Court stated that be-
cause the purpose of Title VII was to eliminate discrimination in
employment, it would not construe section 701(j) as requiring
employers to discriminate against some employees merely to ena-
ble others to observe their religious practices."
conclusion), but forbade the use of benign racial quotas, id. at 271 (Powell, J.); id. at 421
(Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., Rehnquist, J., and Stevens, J., concurring in this conclusion
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976)). Because much
of the Court's analysis related specifically to the history of racial, rather than religious
discrimination; because the interests involved in a medical school's admissions program
differ substantially from the interests in eliminating discrimination in employment; and
generally, because of the divergent views expressed by the Court in six separate opinions,
Bakke sheds little light on Title VII religious discrimination in employment cases.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Weber, 47 U.S.L.W. 3401-02 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1978)
(Nos. 78-432, 78-435, 78-436), granting cert. to 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), however, may
provide some clarification of Hardison's reverse discrimination analysis. One issue before
the Court in Weber is whether Title VII's prohibition against discrimination precludes in-
corporation into a collective bargaining agreement of a voluntary affirmative action plan,
reserving fifty percent of the positions in a craft training program for black applicants,
absent a prior judicial finding of past discrimination. 47 U.S.L.W. 3401 (No. 78-432).
Thus, like Hardison, Weber involves Title VII and a collective bargaining agreement. The
Court's decision later this term, however, will probably be closely tied to an extension of
Bakke's discussion of the need to remedy the effects of our country's long history of racial
discrimination. See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 225-26 (5th
Cir. 1977). Because Title VII's accommodation provision is not intended as a remedy for
past religious discrimination, but as an extension of the first amendment's protection of
religious freedom, see note 25 supra, an historical racial discrimination analysis in Weber
will, again, be of limited value in religious discrimination cases.
52. 432 U.S. at 81.
53. Id. at 84.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 84-85. The Court had elaborated in this same analysis when rejecting the
first suggested accommodation:
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Hardison's analysis indicates the Court considered a broad
applicaton of the accommodation requirement equivalent to re-
quiring employers to engage in. illegal reverse religious discrimi-
nation. Although the Court couched its analysis in terms of
applying the words "undue hardship" to the specific controversy
before it, the interpretation given section 701(j) goes beyond
merely questioning the "reasonableness" of, or the "undue hard-
ship" a given accommodation causes. The Court's reverse reli-
gious discrimination rationale is a general limitation on Title
VII's accommodation provision. This narrow interpretation of an
employer's duty of accommodation provides religious employees
less protection than originally intended by Congress"7 but remains
within the scope of interpretation the words "reasonable accom-
modation" and "undue hardship" allow. Additionally, the
Court's narrow interpretation may have saved the accommoda-
tion requirement from being declared violative of the first amend-
ment's prohibition against any law "respecting an establishment
of religion." 8
Title VII does not contemplate . . .unequal treatment. The repeated, un-
equivocal emphasis of both the language and the legislative history of Title VII
is on eliminating discrimination in employment, and such discrimination is pro-
scribed when it is directed against majorities as well as minorities. . . .It would
be anomalous to conclude that by "reasonable accommodation" Congress
meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preference of some employ-
ees, as well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in order to accommodate
or prefer the religious needs of others, and we conclude that Title VII does not
require an employer to go that far.
Id. at 81.
57. Congress intended § 701(j) to change the law after Dewey, see note 21 and accom-
panying text supra, but the Hardison Court's interpretation of that statute returns the
law of religious discrimination, in practical effect, to nearly the same position as prior to
the passage of § 701(j). The basic concern of Dewey and Hardison was that special conces-
sions to certain employees' religious beliefs would violate Title VII's fundamental prohibi-
tion against religious discrimination.
58. If the Court had given the accommodation requirement a broader interpretation,
it would have needed to reach a decision on the constitutionality of that requirement. 432
U.S. at 69-70 n.4. Two courts and several commentators have concluded that the reasona-
ble accommodation requirement represents a priority of religious over secular interests
and therefore violates the establishment clause of the first amendment. Gavin v. Peoples
Natural Gas Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1431 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 1979); Yott v. North
Am. Rockwell Corp., 428 F. Supp. 763 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Comment, Religious Discrimina-
tion in Employment-the Undoing of Title VII's Reasonable Accommodation Standard,
44 BROOKLYN L. REv. 598, 606-10 (1978); Note, Title VII and Religious Discrimination, Is
Any Accommodation Reasonable Under the Constitution?, 9 Loy. CH. L.J. 413 (1978);
Note, Is Title VII's Reasonable Accommodations Requirement a Law "Respecting an
Establishment of Religion"?, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 481 (1976); Comment, Up Against the
Accommodation Rule, 45 U. Mo. KANSAS Crry L. REv. 56 (1976); 30 VAND. L. REv. 1059
(1977); 62 VA. L. REv. 237 (1976). Contra, Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.
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Lower courts, however, have failed to grasp the essence of
Hardison's reverse religious discrimination rationale and, conse-
quently, they have misinterpreted the case in three different fac-
tual settings. In other cases involving seniority systems prevent-
ing employees from observing their Sabbath or Holy Day prac-
tices, courts have reached the conclusion Hardison requires, but
have oversimplified the Supreme Court's analysis. 51 In union se-
curity cases, union contracts requiring all employees to join or
pay dues to the union within a specified period of time after
beginning employment, prevented employees from following their
religion's rule against joining or supporting unions.10 In these
cases, courts have unfortunately found Hardison inapplicable,
but nevertheless have reached results consistent with an applica-
tion of the Court's reverse religious discrimination rationale. Fi-
nally, courts confronting religious discrimination in a few non-
union cases, in which neither contractual obligations nor seniority
systems prevented employers from accommodating employees'
religious conduct, have reached variant results based on different
interpretations of Hardison."'
In seniority system cases, courts have inexpediently applied
a restricted form of the Hardison rationale. In two cases, the
Eighth Circuit decided against the employee solely because of a
seniority system.2 On facts virtually identical to those in
Hardison, the court, relying on Hardison, held that Title VII does
2d 33, 43-44 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Cummins v. Parker
Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 551-54 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated, 433 U.S. 903 (1977) (remanded
for further consideration in light of Hardison); Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399
F. Supp. 172, 179-80 (W.D.N.C. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977);
Note, Establishment Clause Neutrality and the Reasonable Accommodation
Requirement, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 901 (1977); Comment, Title VII-Sabbath Observer
Discrimination-Reasonable Accommodation-Undue Hardship Standard-Establish-
ment Clause-Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 22 N.Y.L. Scs. L. Rzv. 143, 151-58
(1976).
59. See Rohr v. Western Elec. Co., 567 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1977); Ward v. Allegheny
Ludlum Steel Corp., 560 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1977); Huston v. Local 93, UAW, 559 F.2d 477
(8th Cir. 1977); Wren v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 453 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mo. 1978).
60. See Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3464 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1979) (No. 78-706); Anderson v. General Dynam-
ics, 589 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1978); McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978).
61. See Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1978); Jordan v. North Caro-
lina Nat'l Bank, 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 561 F.2d 658
(6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). Cf. Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (The
court, dismissing an action based on an employee's belief that eating cat food improved
his well-being, held the belief was not protected as religion under Title VII and, therefore,
never addressed the accommodation issue.).
62. Rohr v. Western Elec. Co., 567 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1977); Huston v. Local 93, UAW,
559 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1977).
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not require an employer or a union to accommodate the religious
needs of an employee if such accommodation would deprive other
employees of their contractual rights. 3 The court, however, did
not explore the possibility of other accommodations the seniority
system did not prohibit, as the Hardison Court had done.4 In
another case, the Third Circuit used a somewhat fuller analysis,
indicating that under Hardison the mere presence of a seniority
system does not obviate the accommodation requirement. 1" The
court recognized some accommodations may leave seniority
rights unaffected, and suggested employers must implement such
accommodations unless their cost is more than a de minimis
amount." Even here, however, the court did not refer to
Hardison's underlying analysis of accommodation as reverse reli-
gious discrimination7
Courts should apply the full depth of the Hardison analysis,
even though such an analysis would allow the courts to reach the
same result they have in most seniority system-Sabbath observ-
ance cases. 8 By deciding religious discrimination cases based on
the rules, but not the underlying principle of Hardison, courts
have reduced the reasonable accommodation standard to a con-
fused conglomeration of apparently unrelated concerns: the exist-
ence of a seniority system, the cost of accommodation, and the
contractual basis for the questioned business practice. Only if
courts understand that the common thread of the Supreme
Court's analysis was whether accommodation would benefit one
employee at the expense of other employees will the reasonable
accommodation standard remain a coherent means to resolve fu-
ture claims of religious discrimination.
Union dues cases, the second group of religious discrimina-
tion cases decided since Hardison, have involved situations where
an employer and a union have included a union security clause
63. Rohr v. Western Elec. Co., 567 F.2d 829, 830 (8th Cir. 1977); Huston v. Local 93,
UAW, 559 F.2d 477, 480 (8th Cir. 1977).
64. After stating in a footnote that "[ilt is clear from the language of § 701(j) that
Congress intended to [requirel some form of accommodation," Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 n.9 (1977), the rest of the Court's opinion explains when
accommodation is, in fact, not required. See text accompanying notes 41-59 supra.
65. Ward v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 560 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1977).
66. Id. at 583.
67. Id.
68. Usually, § 701(j) will not require an employer, using a bona fide seniority system
to assign work schedules, to accommodate employee Sabbath practices. The reason fbr
this, under Hardison, however, is not only the existence of a seniority system, but also
that any accommodation not violating the system will cost the employer more than a de
minimus amount, or will discriminate against nonaccommodated employees.
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within a comprehensive collective bargaining agreement. Such
clauses establish either a union shop, requiring employees to join
the union within a specified period of time after employment, or
an agency shop, requiring employees not joining the union to pay
an amount equivalent to union dues to the union."A The union
security clause creates an immediate problem for employees with
religious beliefs against joining or contributing to the support of
unions.70 Lower courts have needlessly and improperly concluded
Hardison does not apply to union dues cases. Hardison's statu-
tory and reverse religious discrimination analyses were written in
broad language that should not be summarily restricted in the
Sabbath observance-seniority system conflict before that Court.7'
Although the broad language of Hardison requires the Court's
rationale be applied in union dues cases, it does not necessarily
follow that lower courts must reach the same conclusion as
Hardison. Applying Hardison's reverse religious discrimination
rationale, however, would require a more thorough factual deter-
mination on how accommodating religious employees seeking
exemption from the union security clause would affect other em-
ployees.
In McDaniel v. Essex International, Inc.,7 2 the Sixth Circuit
virtually ignored Hardison and decided that despite the Taft-
Hartley Act, Title VII requires employers to breach a union
security clause if necessary to accommodate the employee.7" Taft-
Hartley prohibits employers or unions from discriminating
against employees for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging
union membership but specifically permits discrimination for
69. "Closed shops," requiring parties to be union members before obtaining employ-
ment, were outlawed by the Taft-Hartley Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(3), (b)(2)(1976); 23
WAYNE L. REv. 1171, 1172-73 (1977).
70. Seventh-Day Adventists have this belief based on the principle that "a church
member must love his neighbor as himself and that since a church member's employer is
his neighbor he cannot join in such activities of a labor union such as strikes and picketing
without violating the commandment to love his neighbor." Cooper v. General Dynamics,
378 F. Supp. 1258, 1260 (N.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd, 553 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 908 (1977).
71. Apart from the broad language of Hardison, the similarity between the seniority
system and union dues cases would require a Supreme Court pronouncement in either area
be given serious consideration in deciding cases in the other. In both types of cases there
exists a collective bargaining agreement, containing a clause which requires the employer
to make a decision which adversely affects employment status of individuals with particu-
lar religious beliefs.
72. 571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978).
73. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976).
74. 571 F.2d at 343.
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failure to pay union dues.75 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that since
the passage of Title VII, the nation's highest policy priority has
been the elimination of discriminatory employment practices.7 6
The court further unpersuasively stated that section 701(j) re-
quires a "balancing between the religious needs of the individual
and the legitimate business needs of an employer,"" and that this"same balancing applies to the needs of a union, at least where a
claim of discrimination arises from the enforcement of terms of a
collective bargaining agreement." 8 The court apparently inferred
this balancing requirement from the language in section 701(j)
requiring consideration of any "undue hardship on the conduct
of the employer's business." In making this inference, the court
improperly relied on Hardison as support for the proposition that
section 7010) requires employers to make "some effort" to accom-
mod.te employees' religious needs. 79 Although the Hardison
Court did state, early in its opinion, that section 701(j) requires
some effort at accommodation,80 the Court neither intended nor
treated the requirement as an absolute standard.8 ' The Sixth Cir-
cuit erred, then, in relying on the general rule that an employer
must make some effort at accommodation, without also applying
the remainder of the Supreme Court's analysis which carved ex-
ceptions into that general rule.
The Ninth Circuit, in two cases, has followed McDaniel's
erroneous decision not to extend the Hardison analysis of senior-
ity systems to union security clauses.82 In both cases, the Ninth
Circuit relied on Hardison only to support a requirement that the
employer make some effort at accommodation. In neither case,
however, did the court attempt to reconcile the fact that the
Hardison Court had not required accommodation. The Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that Title VII required an employer to accommo-
date religious beliefs against paying union dues unless either the
75. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(3), (b)(2) (1976).
76. 571 F.2d at 343. But cf. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975) (Held: Although national labor policy accords the highest
priority to nondiscriminatory employment practices, this priority does not give racial
minority employees the right to bypass the union, as their exclusive bargaining represent-
ative, to negotiate employment discrimination issues with the employer.).
77. 571 F.2d at 344.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 342.
80. 432 U.S. at 74 n.9.
81. See text accompanying notes 41-59 supra.
82. Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
47 U.S.L.W. 3464 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1979) (No. 78-706); Anderson v. General Dynamics, 589
F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1978).
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employer or the union had actual proof that allowing an exception
to the union security clause would cause undue hardship to the
employer's business.13 Although the Ninth Circuit was correct as
far as it went, the court should have followed through with its
analysis by considering how accommodation would affect other
employees.
To apply Hardison in union dues cases, as the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits should have done, the Supreme Court's reasoning
can be reduced to two components: the analysis of section
703(h)'s special protection of seniority systems and the more gen-
eral reverse religious discrimination analysis. Although section
703(h) of Title VII says nothing about union security provisions,
Taft-Hartley's provisions that an employer may discriminate for
failure to pay union dues, and that no federal statute shall pre-
clude union security agreements, 4 may provide a rationale for
giving union security clauses the same special treatment section
703(h) gives seniority systems. Resolution of the apparent conflict
between section 701(j)'s accommodation provision and Taft-
Hartley's protection of union security agreements must begin
with an examination of congressional intent regarding the two
provisions.
Legislative history is, at best, inconclusive with regard to
whether Congress intended section 701(j) to require employers to
accommodate employees with religious beliefs against joining or
paying dues to a union. Congress considered a similar issue when
passing the 1974 Health Care Amendment to the Wagner Act.'
That amendment extended the jurisdiction of Taft-Hartley to
83. Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 406-07 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3464 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1979) (No. 78-706); Anderson v. General Dynam-
ics, 589 F.2d 397, 402 (9th Cir. 1978).
84. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute
of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement
with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment member-
ship therein . . . Provided further, That no employer shall justify discrimina-
tion against an employee'for nonmembership in a labor organization . . . if he
has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated
for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues
and the initiation fees unifQrmly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
85. Health Services, Health Statistics and Medical Libraries Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-353, 88 Stat. 101-205 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 242-280 (1976)).
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nonprofit hospitals but provided an exemption for health care
employees with religious beliefs against the payment of union
dues.6 Under this amendment, employers must allow such em-
ployees to pay an amount equivalent to union dues to one of three
charities designated in the union collective bargaining contract. 7
One may interpret the passage of this amendment in two ways.
Congress may have intended that this exemption apply only to
the newly covered health care employees, in recognition of the
large number of hospitals operated and largely staffed by Seventh
Day Adventists, who will not pay union dues. 8 Alternatively,
Congress' adoption of the health care amendment, without
changing Taft-Hartley's provision that no statute should pre-
clude union security agreements, may indicate Congress only in-
tended Taft-Hartley to override statutes in existence at the date
of enactment .8  Either interpretaton of the Wagner Act amend-
ment is reasonable. An examination of the legislative history of
the 1974 amendment to the Wagner Act and the 1972 amendment
to Title VII indicates Congress never considered whether section
701(j) requires all employers to accommodate employees with
religious objections to paying union dues.o Because of the incon-
86. Any employee of a health care institution who is a member of and
adheres to established and traditional tenets or teachings of a bona fide religion,
body, or sect which has historically held conscientious objections to joining or
financially supporting labor organizations shall not be required to join or finan-
cially support any labor organization as a condition of employment; except that
such employee may be required, in lieu of periodic dues and initiation fees, to
pay sums equal to such dues and initiation fees to a nonreligious charitable fund
exempt from taxation under section 501 (c)(3) of Title 26, chosen by such em-
ployee from a list of at least three such funds, designated in a contract between
such institution and a labor organization, or if the contract fails to designate
such funds, then to any such fund chosen by the employee.
42 U.S.C. § 169 (1976). See 23 WAYNE L. REV. 1171, 1177-78 (1977).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 169 (1976).
88. The Seventh-Day Adventist Churches operate 49 hospitals and nursing
homes in this country. Should organization take place in those hospitals, it
would appear that many of the employees would have to quit their jobs, rather
than join or financially support a labor organization. Accordingly, to protect
them as well as others working in other health care institutions, we propose
exemption from union membership and financial support for those who are of
and adhere to teachings of a bona fide religion which has historically held
conscientious objections to joining or financially supporting labor organizations.
HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, COVERAGE OF NONPROFIT HOSPITALS UNDER THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATONS ACT, H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974).
89. See 23 WAYNE L. REV. 1171, 1180 (1977).
90. See SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PU3LIC WELFARE, COVERAGE OF NON-PRoFIT Hos-
PITALS UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974), reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3946; H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d
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clusiveness of congressional intent on the applicability of section
701(j)'s accommodation requirement to union security clause
cases, the ultimate resolution of the issue turns on an application
of the second component of the Hardison analysis, the reverse
religious discrimination rationale.
Under Hardison, if accommodating employees with a reli-
gious objection to paying union dues would neither adversely af-
fect other employees nor cause undue hardship to the employer,
then section 701(j) requires employers to make that accommoda-
tion. For example, the employer could grant religious employees
an exemption to the union security provision, conditioned on the
employees paying an amount equivalent to union dues into a
special fund from which the union could contribute to charities.
This conditional exemption would not be illegal reverse religious
discrimination because the exemption would neither give reli-
gious employees an advantage nor cause the employer undue
hardship. The religious employee would not profit from an ex-
emption to the union security clause because he would still have
to pay an amount equivalent to union dues. Although the em-
ployee would still receive the benefits of union representation,'
he would not be eligible for any insurance or pension benefits that
come only with union membership. The religious employees' ex-
emption would not harm the other employees' positions unless
the employer granted exemptions for a substantial number of
employees, thus requiring increased dues for regular union mem-
bers. The adverse affect on other employees through increased
union dues would be reduced, moreover, if unions used contribu-
tions made from the special fund to offset the charitable contribu-
tions generally made by most unions . 2 In the event of such a dues
increase, however, accommodating religious employees could re-
sult in discrimination against other employees and, therefore,
under Hardison, Title VII would not require the accommodation.
The oversimplification and misapplication of Hardison in
recent seniority system and union dues cases has also caused
difficulty for courts applying the reasonable accommodation
standard in cases not involving unions. In the two nonunion cases
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. CON. REP. No. 988, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974J
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3959; 118 CONG. REc. 705 (1974), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HIsToRY, supra note 21, at 711-78.
91. The collective bargaining process would provide all employees such advantages
as higher salaries and better working conditions.
92. Comment, Religious Observations and Discrimination in Employment, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1019, 1043 (1971); 23 WAYNE L. REv. 1171, 1184 (1977).
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decided since Hardison, courts have reached opposite results
based on different interpretations of that case.9 3 In Jordan v.
North Carolina National Bank,"4 the Fourth Circuit held that an
employer need not guarantee a prospective employee work-free
Saturdays to accommodate her Sabbath practices. Without cit-
ing any specific support from Hardison or elsewhere, the court
reasoned that the bank would have to give a no Saturday work
guarantee to all its employees if it gave such a guarantee to the
plaintiff.9 The court then concluded such'a guarantee would en-
tail extra expense, which would constitute undue hardship under
Hardison.9" Contrary to the court's analysis, hQwever, Hardison
would allow the bank to guarantee no Saturday work just for
religious employees. Hardison does not proscribe special treat-
ment because of religion unless such special treatment gives an
advantage to religious employees at the expense of the rights of
other employees. Thus, the proper test for the bank's duty of
accommodation would be whether giving religious employees Sat-
urdays off would adversely affect other employees or cost the
bank more than a de minimis amount, not whether giving all
employees Saturdays off would cost more than a de minimis
amount.
In contrast with Jordan, the Seventh Circuit, in Redmond v.
GAF Corp., 7 properly held that an employer had violated Title
VII by firing an employee who would not work overtime on Satur-
days because he attended a Bible study class. The court reasoned
that after an employee makes out a prima facie case of religious
discrimination,98 the employer had the burden of showing that he
had either made a reasonable effort to accommodate the em-
ployee or that he could not accommodate the religious practice
93. A third nonunion case, Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 561 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1977)
(per curiam), affirmed a district court judgment for the employer in a case involving
Sabbath practices. Although the court stated Hardison required affirmance of the trial
court's decision, the court of appeals neither cited to a particular portion of Hardison nor
gave any analysis to support its reliance on that case. Therefore the question is not
conducive to critical analysis.
94. 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977).
95. Id. at 76.
96. Id.
97. 574 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1978).
98. To make out a prima facie case of religious discrimination, the plaintiff must
inform the employer of his religious practice and of the need for accommodation, but is
under no duty to offer the employer acceptable accommodation or to attempt to accommo-
date himself. Id. at 901-02. Contra, Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 428 F. Supp. 736,
769 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1039 (1978).
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because of undue hardship to his business." This conclusion is a
correct application of the Hardison Court's analysis of section
701(j). Under Hardison, no effort at accommodation is necessary,
if and only if the employer shows that every possible method of
accommodation would cause undue hardship either directly, by
unduly interfering with the operation of the business, or indi-
rectly, by causing reverse religious discrimination.
In all three types of religious discrimination cases arising
since Hardison, then, courts have oversimplified that decision,
missing completely the essence of the Supreme Court's analysis.
The underlying rationale of Hardison was that Title VII does not
require accommodation interfering with other employees' con-
tract rights or benefiting religious employees over nonreligious
employees. In applying this rationale, the Court specifically held
that modifying a contractual seniority system and incurring more
than a de minimis cost for the benefit of a religious employee were
accommodations Title VII did not require. Lower courts, how-
ever, have focused on various other aspects of the Hardison opin-
ion with the result that section 701(j)'s reasonable accommoda-
tion standard, though clearly defined in Hardison, has become
confused through misapplication. Courts have oversimplified
Hardison, applying it in a conclusory, incomplete fashion in sen-
iority system cases and dismissing it without adequately distin-
guishing it in union dues cases. A continued misreading of
Hardison will frustrate future applications of the reasonable ac-
commodation standard. Although more complete application of
the Court's reverse religious discrimination rationale may not
provide as extensive protection for religious employees as Con-
gress originally intended, the rationale is flexible enough for the
courts to fashion equitable remedies and, more importantly, con-
sistent enough to help employers determine their obligations to
religious employees.
Randall J. Borkowski
99. 574 F.2d at 903.
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